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CHAPTER 9 
Domestic Relations 
NEIL L CHAYET 
AND 
HARVEY W. FREISHTAT• 
§9.1. Introduction. The fundamental nature of the familial relation-
ship, including the rights and responsibilities which spring from it and 
the means of its dissolution, has continued to be the subject of public 
interest and scrutiny. While much of the attention has focused on the 
Legislature where a variety of "no-fault divorce" bills have been filed, 
both the Supreme Judicial Court and, more recently, the Appeals Court 
have been active in the area of domestic relations. 
A. CoURT DECISIONS 
§9.2. Separate support: Scope of the decree. Probably the seminal 
decision in the area of separate support over the last several years has 
been the case of Gould v. Gould.1 In that case; the wife of a wealthy man 
(net annual income of $89,000 and assets of one-half million dollars)2 had 
petitioned for separate support under G.L. c. 209, §32.8 Considering the 
traditional factors adopted in Coe v. Coe• and its successors-husband's 
financial worth, wife's needs, the couple's station in life and their manner 
of living-the probate court had ordered the husband to pay $2500 
monthly for support and maintenance of the wife and children, a lump sum 
of $6,000, reasonable medical and dental expenses of the family, and 
reasonable educational expenses of the children in addition to counsel 
fees in the amount of $6,000.11 It had also ordered the sale of the jointly-
owned house, an equal division of the proceeds, and a division of per-
• Nm. L CHAYET and HARVEY W. FulsHTAT are members of the Boston firm of 
Cbayet and Sonnenreicb, P.C. 
§9.2. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. lJl5, 267 N.E.2d 652 (1971). 
2 Id. at 516, 267 N.E.2d at 654. 
8 Id. at 515, 267 N.E.2d at 655. 
4 515 Mass. 252, 255, 46 N.E.2d 1017, 1019 (1945). 
I Id. at 515, 267 N.E.2d at 655. 
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sonal property within the house.e The husband appealed from the 
amount of the decree. 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decree as being well within 
the discretion of the lower court, except as to the forced sale of the 
house and division of the proceeds.7 There, the court quoted extensively 
from Dunnington v. Dunnington,s which held that there was no authority 
in the probate court to order a conveyance of real estate between the 
spouses as security for compliance with a separate support decree.e Re-
affirming that judicial authority in the area of separate support was 
not as broad as in the area of alimony, the court noted that at the time 
of the lower court decree there was no provision in the law of separate 
support analogous to the provision permitting a court to require security 
for the payment of alimony.1o Even if G.L. c. 209, §32D, which imple-
ments separate support decrees ordering a conveyance of property, had 
been applicable at the time of this action,U that statute would "not 
authorize the provision made in this case ... ,"12 Thus the provision of 
the decree relating to the sale of the house and division of the proceeds 
was stricken.18 Thus, the venerable holding of Coe, that a court may not 
provide for a division of joint property or property of the husband in a 
separate support proceeding,14 remained seemingly undisturbed. 
At one point, the court indicated that the fatal defect in the probate 
decree was the adequacy of the wife's support without the forced sale, 
thereby terminating whatever limited authority the lower court might 
have had to order a general division of the properties.15 At another 
point, however, the court affirmed that portion of the decree which had 
granted the wife for use in her new apartment various items of personal 
property then contained in the house.16 Such a division of personalty 
was explained by the court to be "incidental to the order for support 
and within the scope of the general equity jurisidiction of causes between 
husband and wife."17 It was further explained to be consistent with 
Dunnington's concept of "temporary support," providing a "sensible solu-
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 317-18, 267 N.E.2d at 655. 
8 324 Mass. 610, 87 N.E.2d 847 (1949). 
9 Id. at 613, 87 N.E.2d at 849. 
10 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 317-18, 267 N.E.2d at 655. 
11 The court indicated that G.L. c. 209, §32D would have "full effect" in cases where 
property had first been attached pursuant to §33. 
12 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at !118, 267 N.E.2d at 655. 
18 Id. at 319, 267 N.E.2d at 655. 
14 3U Mass. at 235, 46 N.E.2d at 1019. 
15 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 318, 267 N.E.2d at 655. · 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
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tion to a practical problem" in accordance with "broad equitable and 
humane considerations. "18 
In the area of separate support, therefore, Gould had suggested dis-
tinctions based upon: whether support provisions were adequate or in-
adequate without division of property; whether the division was to 
constitute permanent or temporary support; whether the property sought 
to be divided was realty or personalty; and whether, if realty, the property 
had been attached at some point in the proceedings. 
These fertile but somewhat ambiguous distinctions made in Gould 
were at issue when the Appeals Court considered Dee v. Dee19 this past 
year. The precise question on appeal was whether the probate court had 
the power to order the husband, by a separate support decree, to vacate 
the jointly-owned marital home in favor of the wife and child for an 
indefinite period of time. No attachment of the home involved had been 
made by the wife.2o Nor, apparently, was there any doubt that the hus-
band could afford to support· the wife and child, and even pay for their 
separate living accomodations, without his vacating the home.21 Since 
the husband, as a tenant by the entirety, was entitled by law to possession 
and control of the home under normal circumstances, the court saw no 
rationale for disturbing this possession, in accordance with Gould and 
Dunnington,22 _ 
While the wife relied on two recent statutes to support her claimed 
right to exclusive use of the home, the court found such reliance mis-
placed.28 In the case of G.L. c. 208, §34B, the court construed its author-
ity to order a spouse to vacate the marital home as specifically confined to 
a sixty-day limit during the pendency of separate support proceedings.24 It 
found no authority to order a spouse to vacate the home indefinitely into 
the future.211 As for G.L. c. 209, §32D, the court, following Gould, held 
the statute inapplicable to cases where the husband was otherwise capable 
of providing adequate support for his wi£e.2tl The statute was construed 
as providing a means for implementing decrees ordering the conveyance 
of property rather than as conferring any independent authority to order 
such a conveyance. 27 
Unlike the wife in Gould, however, the wife in Dee requested the use 
of the home, not division of its ownership or proceeds from its sale.2s In 
18 Id. 
19 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. S69, 296 N.E.2d 521. 
20 Id., 296 N.E.2d at 522. 
21 Id. at 370, 296 N.E.2d at 522. 
22 Id. at 371, 296 N.E.2d at 523. 
28 Id. at 372, 296 N.E.2d at 523. 
24 Id. at 371-72, 296 N.E.2d at 523. 
211 Id. at 371, 296 N.E.2d at 523. 
26 Id. at 372, 296 N.E.2d at 523-24. 
27 Id. at 372-73, 296 N.E.2d at 524. 
28 Id. at 369, 296 N.E.2d at 522. 
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the belief that the operative distinction in Gould was between temporary 
and permanent support, the wife claimed that all she sought was posses-
sion and use, subject to the husband's continued ownership interest in 
the home and power to dispose of it in good faith.29 For Judge Goodman 
in dissent, Mrs. Dee's claim was analogous less to Mrs. Gould's claimed 
right to a division of the real property than to her claimed right to the 
use of various items of personal property, a right which the Gould court 
had affirmed on the basis of broad practical and equitable considera-
tions.8o Since the probate court could have made Mr. Dee's support 
order, including the cost of suitable lodging for his dependents, so high 
that he would have voluntarily vacated the home to his wife and child, 
Judge Goodman felt that judicial candor required the court to acknowl-
edge and exercise such power directly.81 Particularly in a case where the 
wife had been granted custody of a young, school-age child, for whom 
change of residence could be traumatic, the dissent found judicial 
power to order the husband's vacating of the home in the broad equitable 
provisions of G.L. c. 209, §32 et seq. and the " 'principles of fair dealing 
between husband and wife' which are properly considered in such a 
proceeding" (citing Gould).82 
Curiously, then, both the majority and dissenting opinions in Dee 
relied heavily on Gould in support of their positions. Instead of directly 
examining and discussing the dissent's use of Gould, however, the ma-
jority chose to draw narrow and rather technical distinctions, e.g., by 
questioning whether the husband in Gould actually owned the various 
items of personalty he was ordered to convey to his wife's use.aa Thus 
while the breadth of separate support decrees will apparently continue to 
be a function primarily of the husband's capacity to support his wife 
without a conveyance of property, the extent to which Gould's other 
distinctions affect the scope of decrees remains unsettled, even after Dee. 
§9.3. Separate support: Jurisdiction. In Thomas v. Thomas,1 a hus-
band who had procured a Florida divorce with no requirement of ali-
mony, appealed from the subsequent granting of the wife's petition for 
separate support brought in the Commonwealth.2 The husband claimed 
that the Florida decree was entitled to full faith and credit and that he 
should, therefore, have no support obligation.8 The wife, however, had not 
filed an appearance or participated in the Florida proceedings and had 
29 Id. at !169·70, 296 N.E.2d at 522. 
80 Id. at 374, 296 N.E.2d at 524-25. 
81 Id. at 375, 296 N.E.2d at 525. 
82 Id., 296 N.E.2d at 525. Gould v. Gould, 359 Mass. 29, 33, 267 N.E.2d 652, 655 (1971). 
88 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 371 n.ll, 296 N.E.2d at 522-23 n.3. 
§9.3. 1 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 337, 295 N.E.2d 907. 
2 Id. at 337, 295 N.E.2d at 908. 
s Id. at !1!19, 295 N .E.2d at 909. 
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challenged the jurisdiction of the Florida courts in the course of her 
action in the Massachusetts probate courts.4 
In affirming the probate court decree, the Appeals Court restated what 
has become well-settled law: where a divorce proceeding in one juris-
diction is ex parte, the jurisdictional basis of the proceeding is review-
able in a proceeding brought in another jurisdiction by the other party.11 
Here, Florida's six-month residence requirement was construed as a 
domicil requirement which, after examination of all the evidence, in-
cluding the husband's teaching position in Boston and his own state-
ment giving Massachusetts as his permanent address on a loan application, 
it was held he did not satisfy.u Thus the husband's Florida divorce was a 
nullity, as well as his immediately subsequent marriage in 1968 to a 
woman with whom he had been living happily ever since.T The delay 
between the probate court decree of separate support, apparently in 1969, 
and the husband's appeal is unexplained. 
§9.4. Divorce: Separation agreements. In Surabian v. Surabian,t the 
husband and wife entered into a separation agreement whereby he was 
to pay weekly alimony, provided, however, that "if the wife remarries 
such support and maintenance shall forthwith cease and terminate and 
the husband (libellee) will be under no further obligation to pay any 
moneys for the support of the said wife."2 This termination-upon-remar-
riage provision was incorporated into the divorce decree. Five years after 
the divorce, the wife (libellant) remarried, and the payments ceased in 
accordance with the agreement.8 One year later, however, this second 
marriage was annulled.' Libellee petitioned to modify the original divorce 
decree by deletion of the alimony provision in view of libellant's re-
marriage;11 libellant, whose claim was that the annullment of her second 
marriage justified the resumption of alimony as if that marriage had 
never occurred, appealed from the granting of the petition.u 
In the first of a three-part opinion, the court ruled that the separation 
agreement, while incorporated by reference in the divorce decree, also 
survived it even though such survival was not specified in the agreement 
itsel£.7 The court, via footnote, established a "general rule" that separa-
4 Id., 295 N.E.2d at 909. 
II Id. See also Cohen v. Cohen, ll19 Mass. 31, !14, 64 N.E.2d 689, 691 (1946); Rubinstein 
v. Rubinstein, 319 Mass. 568, 571, 66 N.E.2d 793, 795 (1946). 
6 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at ll40, 295 N.E.2d at 910. 
7 Id., 295 N.E.2d at 910. 
§9.4. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1461, 285 N.E.2d 909 (1972). 
2 Id. at 1461, 285 N.E.2d at 910. 
8 Id. at 1462, 285 N.E.2d at 910. 
4 Id., 285 N.E.2d at 910. 
II Id., 285 N.E.2d at 910-11. 
6 Id., 285 N.E.2d at 911. 
7 Id. at 146ll, 285 N.E.2d at 9ll. 
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tion agreements presumptively survive divorce decrees in which they are 
incorporated unless otherwise specified by the parties.8 
This marked a change from prior law which, from Schillander v. 
Schillander,o Fabrizio v. Fabrizio,to and Freeman v. Sieveu through the 
recent Hills v. Shearer,12 had stated that the question of the agreement's 
survival turned on the parties' intent, "to be ascertained by a reading of 
the entire agreement."18 Inasmuch as the libellant was seeking to establish 
a right to alimony based upon the divorce decree rather than upon the 
separation agreement, the "general rule" established by the court was 
dictum. It suggests, however, that parties to future separation agreements 
will have an almost automatic right to the advantages of both a non-
modifiable contract and an enforceable decree even in the absence of spe-
cific stipulation. 
In the second part of the opinion, the court addressed the question of 
whether libellant was entitled to alimony under the divorce decree de-
spite its termination-upon-remarriage provision.14 Libellant argued that 
under Massachusetts law, a decree containing a provision incorporated 
from a separation agreement is still to be construed on the basis of ju-
dicial intent rather than the intent of the parties.u The court, while 
agreeing with libellant's argument, ruled that the probate judge had at 
least constructive knowledge of both the termination provision in the 
agreement and the common law precedent that such a provision in an 
agreement takes effect upon the ceremony of remarriage itself, in accor-
dance with Gerrig v. Sneirson.1e The judge's decision not to modify the 
provision upon issuing the decree required the conclusion that he in-
tended to define remarriage as the remarriage ceremony itself, thereby 
preventing alimony payments from being reinstated after the subsequent 
annulment.t7 
Analytically, the Surabian decision requires no further elaboration. 
Yet in the last two footnotes to the opinion, the court went out of its 
way to indicate its attentiveness to the forces of social change as they 
begin to impact upon the law of domestic relations. On the issue of 
remarriage terminating the right to alimony, the court intimated its 
intention to reconsider Robbins v. Robbins18 "if the occasion presents 
8 Id. at 1463 n.4, 285 N.E.2d at 911 n.4. 
9 !107 Mass. 96, 29 N.E.2d 686 (1940). 
10 316 Mass. !14!1, 55 N.E.2d 604 (1944). 
11 !12!1 Mass. 652, 84 N.E.2d 16 (1949). 
12 !155 Mass. 405, 245 N.E.2d 25!1 (1969). 
18 Id. at 408, 245 N.E.2d at 256. 
14 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1464, 285 N.E.2d at 912. 
111 Id. at 1465, 285 N.E.2d at 912. 
18 !144 Mass. 518, 183 N.E.2d 1!11 (1962). 
11 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1465, 285 N.E.2d at 912. 
18 343 Mass. 247, 178 N.E.2d 281 (1961). 
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itsel£."19 In that case, the court had required reinstatement of alimony 
after annulment of a later marriage, citing the equities of the particular 
situation.2o There, however, the absence of a termination-upon-remarriage 
provision in either an agreement or the decree left unclear the intent of 
the parties and the court as to the effect of annulment after remarriage 
upon the original alimony obligation. Via footnote, the Surabian court 
now suggested that the probate court's determination of the equity of a 
termination provision could "appropriately take into account the en-
hanced ability and desire of women today to look after their own affairs 
and to provide for their own economic well-being."21 In the succeeding 
footnote, the court predicted that "changes in the status of women" 
might justify movement towards a blanket rule of alimony terminating 
upon remarriage--a direct reversal of the Robbins case-by-case approach.22 
Venturing even further beyond the issue immediately at hand, the court 
announced that changes in "both popular and legal thinking" could not 
help but have future significance for "the setting of both the amount and 
terms of alimony."23 · 
Surabian, broadly construed, is the court's pronouncement of its 
readiness to view the marital relationship in a new light. In traditional 
cases like Coe, for example, wives were perceived as tied to their hus-
bands' pursestrings and to the type of life their husbands had afforded 
them. While Coe is a case of separate support rather than alimony, that 
cannot entirely bridge the gap between its traditional views and the bold 
language, dicta, and footnotes of Surabian. For in Surabian, the court 
is intimating that decrees of alimony and separate support in the future 
will turn more heavily on the wife's capacity to be economically self-
sufficient. By the same token, Coe prohibited wives, after years of service 
as homemakers and housekeepers, from having a share of the husband-
owned or jointly-owned property acquired during the marital relationship 
except where the husband's support would be otherwise inadequate.24 
Surabian states that "specific property may be ordered transferred as pay-
ment of alimony," without limiting such authority to cases of otherwise 
inadequate support.25 One possible implication is that property, like 
other aspects of the economic relationship of the spouses, will be subject 
to considerations of equity and fair dealing in determining its dispo-
sition upon dissolution of the marriage. 
§9.5. Divorce: Scope of the decree. In Ober v. Ober,1 the Appeals 
19 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1467 n.8, 285 N.E.2d at 913 n.8. 
20 !143 Mass. at 252, 178 N.E.2d at 284. 
21 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1466 n.7, 285 N.E.2d at 91!1 n.7. 
22 ld. at 1467 n.8, 285 N.E.2d at 913 n.8. 
23 Id. at 1466-67 n.7, 285 N.E.2d at 91!1 n.7. 
24 !113 Mass. 2!12 at 2!16, 46 N.E.2d at 1020. 
25 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1466, 285 N.E.2d at 9l!l. 
§9.5. 1 ::17!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. !Ill, 294 N.E.2d 449. 
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Court examined and clarified two significant areas relating to the scope 
of divorce decrees. The first area concerned the grounds for divorce. The 
evidence introduced in the principal case showed a seriously ill husband 
who was victimized for years by his wife's repeated but groundless accusa-
tions of infidelity.2 The probate court had granted the husband a divorce 
for cruel and abusive treatment, after a finding of causal connection be-
tween the accusations and ill health.8 The Appeals Court found no evi-
dence that the husband's health was in fact impaired by the wife's 
accusations.4 It did find, however, that the wife had caused the husband 
"to be upset and angry" making it "reasonably likely" that injury to his 
health "would have followed as a natural consequence" of her actions.ll 
Rather than requiring demonstration of the actual adverse effects of the 
other spouse's behavior-a requirement which has often fostered exag-
gerations and fabrications-the court in Ober indicated that a spouse 
could also prove cruel and abusive treatment by merely showing the 
"reasonably likely" adverse effects of the complained-of behavior.6 
The second significant aspect of Ober was its discussion of the principles 
of alimony. The award of $60 per week alimony to the wife was upheld 
as adequate, since the wife's independent earning capacity was judged to 
be $160 per week based on employment three years before.7 It was 
apparently unimportant to the court that the wife was now sixty-one 
years old, with decreased and further decreasing earning capacity. At the 
same time, the lower court's award to the husband of a portion of the 
wife's estate as alimony was reversed as unnecessary to the husband's 
support and hence an unlawful division of property.s The court restated 
that the same principles of determining alimony to the wife were ap-
plicable in determining an award of property in the nature of alimony to 
the husband, i.e., financial means of the payor, necessities of the payee, the 
condition in life of the spouses, and their mode of living. Since the hus-
band's condition was substantially similar to that of the wife's, an award 
of property was deemed improper. 
In Blitzer v. Blitzer,o the husband appealed from that part of the 
decree of divorce granted to the wife which ordered him to convey his 
interest in the jointly-owned marital home.to A Pennsylvania resident 
on whom service had been made only by publication and mail, the 
husband had not contested the libel on the merits but had entered a 
2 Id. at 34, 294 N.E.2d at 450. 
aId. 
4 Id. 
II ld. 
6 Id. 
7 Id. at 34-35, 294 N.E.2d at 451. 
8 Id. 
9 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 985, 282 N.E.2d 918. 
to Id., 282 N.E.2d at 919. 
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special appearance contesting any ordered conveyance of the attached 
home in lieu of alimony.u The probate court had found that conveyance 
was the "only practical way" to satisfy the wife's support requirements and 
so ordered.12 After assuming, arguendo, that the husband's special appear-
ance was proper, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the probate court 
lacked the jurisdiction to order the husband personally to convey property 
to the wife.1B 
To be compared with the above case is Mclssac v. Peck,!'' also decided 
in the 1972 Survey year, which decided the liability of an out-of-state 
executor for the unpaid separate support payments of the petitioner's 
deceased husband, who at the time of his death was a foreign domiciliary 
with substantial foreign but no Massachusetts assets.111 The court affirmed 
the lower court decision that jurisdiction was lacking to enter a money 
decree.1s In Blitzer, however, the court held that there was jurisdiction to 
enter a quasi in rem decree applying the husband's one-half interest in 
the property to the wife's support.17 In so doing, the court reaffirmed the 
long line of cases including Dunnington18 and Klar v. Klar19 which hold 
that the probate court is authorized to apply property in lieu of alimony 
when necessary for the wife's support.2o Since courts are acknowledged to 
have broader powers with alimony than separate support, it remains to 
be seen whether analogous authority exists in the area of separate support 
to order a conveyance of property where no personal jurisdiction has 
been acquired. Even G.L. c. 209, §32D, a recent statute which implements 
property conveyances in separate support proceedings, appears to pre-
suppose personal jurisdiction. 
§9.6. Foreign divorce. The latest installment of foreign divorce cases 
raised the issue of the wife's right to maintain a petition for separate 
support after a foreign divorce had been granted to her husband. In 
Wiswall v. Wiswall,1 where the wife petitioned for separate support after 
a Nevada divorce had been granted to her husband, the probate decree. 
granting the petition was sustained by the Supreme Judicial Court.2 
Since the wife had refused to file a Nevada appearance, and the husband 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 986, 282 N.E.2d at 919. 
13 Id. at 987, 282 N.E.2d at 920. 
H 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 786, 281 N.E.2d 610. 
111 Id., 281 N.E.2d at 610. 
16 Id. 
1'1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 987, 282 N.E.2d at 920. 
18 824 Mass. 610, 87 N.E.2d 847 (1949). 
19 822 Mass. 59, 76 N.E.2d 5 (1947). 
20 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 988, 282 N.E.2d at 920. 
§9.6. 1 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 648, 281 N.E.2d 288. 
2 Id. at 648-49, 281 N.E.2d at 288. 
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was found not to have been a Nevada domiciliary, the Nevada divorce 
was held void for lack of jurisdiction. a 
In McCarthy v. McCarthy/• however, the wife had not only appeared 
through her attorney in the Mexican proceedings but had signed a docu-
ment by which the husband's interest in jointly-held property was con-
veyed to her in exchange for acquiescence to the Mexican decree.s In 
view of her Mexican appearance and "acceptance of valuable considera-
tion in return therefor," the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the probate 
decree and barred her from maintaining such a petition.e 
Gosselin v. Gosselin' raised the issue of whether in the case of an out-of-
state divorce by a husband resulting in an order of child support without 
alimony, the wife was entitled to sue for alimony in the courts of the 
Commonwealth.8 Since the authority to award alimony is purely statutory 
under G.L. c. 208, §34,9 the issue turned on construction of the statutory 
word "divorce."10 If the term included all divorces, both foreign and 
domestic, then the wife could petition for alimony; if the term referred 
only to domestic divorces, then the wife could not so petition. After apply-
ing a variety of principles of statutory construction and after reviewing 
the legislative history of the statute, the Appeals Court held that "di-
vorce" was limited to divorce decrees issued in the Commonwealth.ll 
Thus courts of the Commonwealth were held to be without authority to 
award alimony based on foreign divorce decrees. It should be noted, 
nevertheless, that nothing in the opinion affects the authority of courts, 
upon petition under G.L. c. 208, §35,12 to enforce foreign divorce decrees 
where alimony has been awarded. 
§9.7. Divorce: Psychotherapist-patient privilege in custody proceed-
ings. The case of U sen v. U sen1 raised the interesting issue of the 
admissibility of psychiatric testimony on the question of child custody. 
Subsequent to a divorce proceeding in which the mother was awarded 
custody, the father petitioned for custody.2 He called one of the mother's 
8 Id. 
4 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 511, 280 N.E.2d 151 (1972). 
II Id., 280 N.E.2d at 152. 
8 Id. at 512, 280 N.E.2d at 152. 
T 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 157, 294 N.E.2d 555. 
8 Id., 294 N.E.2d at 556. 
9 G.L c:. 208, §84 states: "Upon a divorce, or upon petition at any time after a 
divorce, the court may deaee alimony to the wife, or a part of her estate, in the nature 
of alimony, to the husband." 
10 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 157, 294 N.E.2d at 556. 
11 Id. at 159-60, 294 N.E.2d at 557. 
12 G.L c:. 208, §85 states: "The court may enforce decrees, including foreign decrees, 
for allowance, alimony or allowance in the nature of alimony." 
§9.7. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 79!1, 269 N.E.2d 442. 
:a Id., 269 N.E.2d at 445. 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 12
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1973/iss1/12
230 1973 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S LAW §9.8 
former psychotherapists to testify and introduced into evidence letters 
written by the mother's therapists and contained in a hospital recorda 
The oral testimony and written evidence related to the diagnosis and 
treatment of the mother's mental condition. The mother excepted to 
their admission.' 
The Supreme Judicial Court quickly disposed of the father's reliance 
on the hospital record exception to the hearsay rule, stating that the 
hearsay statute in no way superseded the statute establishing a psycho-
therapist-patient privilege.ll The privilege to prevent a: disclosure. by one's 
therapist in court could not be jeopardized by the mere recording of that 
disclosure in a hospital record.& The father's second argument relied on 
the specific statutory exception to the psychotherapist-patient privilege.7 
That exception authorizes a therapist to provide evidence· in child cus-
tody proceedings where: (a) the therapist believes such disclosure is in 
the child's best interestS, and (b) the court finds, after hearing the evidence 
in chambers, that the interests of justice outweigh the importance of the 
privilege.s Since the preconditions to the exception were ignored in this 
case, the court had little trouble holding the evidence inadmissible.8 
As a matter of strict statutory interpretation, Usen is unchallengeable; 
confidentiality in the therapist"patient setting should not be lightly 
sacrificed to loose procedures. Present statutory procedures seem inappro-
priate, however, where the psychotherapist having valuable information 
as to the mental and emotional condition of the would-be custodian 
chooses not to come forward with testimony. Whether the interests in 
disclosure outweigh the value of the privilege should not be the thera-
pist's decision in the first instance; a statutory amendment authorizing 
the court to initiate the disclosure process would place the ultimate 
responsibility for determining the proper balance where it belongs. 
§9.8. Adoption. In re Child,l decided by the Appeals Court last 
term, dealt with the petition of an eighteen-year-old mother, whose child 
was born out of wedlock, to withdraw the consent she had given for 
surrender of the child for adoption. The probate court had found that 
her consent had been voluntary and fully informed, even though at the 
8 Id. at 794, 269 N.E.2d at 443. 
4 Id. 
II Id. at 795, 269 N.E.2d at 443. G.L c. 2!1!1, §20B states in pertinent part: 
Except as hereinafter provided, in any court proceeding ••• a patient shall have 
the privilege ••• of preventing a witness from disclosing ••• any communication, 
wherever made, between said patient and a psychotherapist relative to the diagnosis 
or treatment of the patient's mental or emotional condition • • . • 
8 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 795, 269 N.E.2d at 444. 
T ld. 
8 Id. at 795·96, 269 N.E.2d at 444. 
e Id. at 797, 269 N.E.2d at 444. 
§9.8. 1 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 299, 295 N.E.2d 693. 
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time of surrender one week after birth, the mother was "nervous and 
upset" and without the advice of counsel.2 The Appeals Court affirmed 
the finding, stating that "[n]o statute has said that surrenders are valid 
only if executed free from emotion, tensions and pressures caused by the 
situation."3 Given the voluntariness of the consent, the mother could 
have been permitted to withdraw it only if the welfare of the child 
would be thereby served. To the contrary, however, the probate court 
had found that the child's best interests were served by remaining with 
his prospective adoptive parents.4 That finding was now affirmed on the 
basis of the "bonds of affection and confidep.ce [which] rapidly arise" 
between a young child and the family it is placed with.li While the 
mother's original petition had been filed nine months after surrender of 
the child, it is not clear from the Appeals Court opinion how long the 
child had been apart from the mother at the time of the initial hearing. 
The hearing on appeal inexplicably occurred more than three years after 
the mother's surrender of the child. Nonetheless the court concluded: 
"The interests of the natural parents in such a case must be completely 
subordinated to the paramount interests of the child."6 Evidence of the 
child's best interests was presented, in part, in the form of expert psychi-
atric testimony, the introduction and use of which was also affirmed.7 
Consent to Adoption of a Minors involved the appeal of a mother from 
the denial of her petition to vacate a decree of the probate court dis-
pensing with the necessity of her consent to the adoption of her son.9 
The original petition to dispense with the mother's consent under what 
was then G.L. c. 210, §§3 and 3A had been filed in 1968 by the Catholic 
Charitable Bureau of Boston which had placed the child in a foster 
home five days after its out-of-wedlock birth and had paid for its expenses 
during the following year.1o Notice of that petition had been mailed to 
the mother who, upon advice of counsel, had not accepted it; official 
notice was, therefore, by publication.u 
On appeal to the Supreme Judicial Court, the mother claimed that 
the probate court was without jurisdiction to enter its decree, since per-
2 Id. at 302, 295 N.E.2d at 695. 
3 Id. at 304, 295 N.E.2d at 697. 
4 I d. at 305, 295_ N.E_.2d at 697. While the mother's original petition had been filed 
nine months after surrender of the child, it is not clear from the Appeals Court opinion 
how long the child had been apart from the mother at the time of initial hearing. The 
hearing on appeal inexplicably occurred more than three years after the initial surren-
der. 
li Id. at 306, 295 N.E.2d at 697. 
6 Id., 295 N.E.2d at 698 (citing Adoption of a Minor, 338 Mass. 635, 643, 156 N.E.2d 
801' 806 (1959)). 
7 Id., 295 N.E.2d at 698. 
s 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 711, 296 N.E.2d 176 (1973). 
9 Id. at 712, 296 N.E.2d a~ 178. 
10 Id. at 713·14, 296 N.E.2d at 178·79. 
11 Id. at 714, 296 N.E.2d at 179. 
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sonal service had never been obtained.12 That claim was rejected, how-
ever, since notice by certified mail was held to be sufficient to constitute 
personal service.1a The mother then claimed on the merits that her 
consent was required under G.L. c. 210, §2 and could not be dispensed 
with as an exception under §§3 or 3A.14 Since the latter provision was 
construed by the court to authorize broad judicial inquiry into the best 
interests of the child regardless of whether a party was unfit or in-
capacitated under section S, the mother's substantive claim was also 
rejected.111 
The decision thereby emphasized the extensive power given to the 
probate court in adoption proceedings to determine the best interests 
of the child, a power which had been even further expanded on the 
legislative front by the repeal in 1972 of section 3A and the incorporation 
of most of its provisions into section S. 
Parents' rights in children voluntarily placed in the custody of the 
Department of Public Welfare received further amplification by the 
Supreme Judicial Court in two cases, Boyns v. Department of Public 
Welfare16 and White v. Minter.n The petitioner in Boyns involved a 
mother seeking a writ of habeas corpus for the return of her minor 
daughter two months after her transfer to the custody of the Division of 
Child Guardianship (DCG) under a voluntary agreement pursuant to 
G.L. c. 119, §23, ~ A.1S Despite the termination of the agreement by the 
mother, the DCG refused to return the child to her mother but chose 
instead to seek legal custody under G.L. c. 119, §23, 1f c.111 While the 
superior court, upon consideration of the best interests of the child, had 
denied the writ, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the DCG was 
required to institute custody proceedings if it sought to retain physical 
custody after parental termination of the agreement.2o Since, in this 
particular case, the mother had had the DCG enjoined from seeking such 
legal custody, the court ordered the injunction vacated and reversed the 
lower court order denying the writ.21 The court held that if neither 
the mother nor the DGG sought custody of the child within sixty days, the 
writ would then be allowed.22 If such a petition were filed, however, the 
issues would be "peculiarly appropriate for hearing and determination 
12 Id. at 716, 296 N.E.2d at 180. 
18 Id. at 716-17, 296 N.E.2d at 180-81. 
14 Id. at 717-19, 296 N.E.2d at 181-82. 
111 Id. at 719-20, 296 N.E.2d at 182. 
16 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1777, 276 N.E.2d 716. 
11 !1!10 F. Supp. 1194 (D. Mass. 1971). 
18 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1777, 276 N.E.2d at 717. 
111 Id. at 1778, 276 N.E.2d at 717. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1779, 276 N.E.2d at 718. 
22 Id. 
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by the probate court,"ll8 as opposed to the superior court in which the 
action had been brought. 
In White v. Minter, the plaintiff was a mother seeking to regain custody 
of her infant son and to challenge the constitutionality of G.L. c. 119, 
§2S, f E before a three-judge federal court.ll4 The child, who had been 
placed by the mother with a friend pending her recuperation from an 
assault had, unbeknownst to her, been transferred to DCG when the 
friend herself entered the hospital.llll As soon as she learned of the 
transfer, the mother demanded return of the child but was refused be-
cause of her alleged abandonment.28 She was advised by the DCG to con-
sider placing him for adoption. As in the Boyns situation, the DCG had 
neither instituted custody proceedings nor held an administrative hearing 
to determine the mother's fitness.27 
The federal court refused to decide the mother's due process challenge 
to the constitutionality of the statute on its face.2s It held, however, that 
the statute had been unconstitutionally applied when the DCG failed 
to afford the mother "an opportunity to appear before any tribunal, 
whether administrative or judicial, to contest a decision presumably made 
by a case worker and her supervisor .... "29 The DCG was consequently 
ordered either to petition for custody within one week or to surrender 
the child back to the mother.ao 
The effect of the Boyns and White decisions was thus to ensure the 
continuity of the parent-child relationship in the absence of timely ad-
ministrative or judicial procedures that satisfy the requirements of consti-
tutional due process. Beyond that, both decisions suggested the probate 
court as the forum most appropriate to resolution of the care and cus-
tody of children. Though no official family court structure has been es-
tablished in the Commonwealth, recent case laws is vesting increasing 
authority in the probate courts. 
§9.9. Guardianship. Russell v. Lovell'- addressed the question of the 
law to be applied when a ward petitions for an accounting and distribu-
tion of property held by his guardian-that is, ought the court use the 
law of the ward's domicile or that of the jurisdiction creating the guard-
ianship? In an earlier conflicts case involving the personal custody of 
23 Id., 276 N.E.2d at 717. 
24 330 F. Supp. at 1195-96. 
28 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. at 1197. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 1198. 
§9.9. 1 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 75, 291 N.E.2d 735. The specific conflicts problems at 
issue, Vermont's 18 year old age of majority as opposed to Massachusetts' age of 21, has 
been rendered moot by the General Court's lowering of majority to 18 in this Survey 
Year. Talcot v. Chamberlain, 149 Mass. 57, 20 N.E. !105 (1889). 
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the ward himself, the law of the jurisdiction creating the guardianship 
was held to prevail.2 Here, there was a possible distinction in that guard-
dianship of property alone was at issue. Nonetheless, the court gave 
weight to the fact that, while the ward was now a Vermont domiciliary, 
the guardians were Massachusetts domiciliaries and the guardianship 
was both created and administered by Massachusetts. Massachusetts was 
therefore held to have a more substantial relationship to the transaction, 
and its law of majority was held to apply in affirming the dismissal of the 
ward's petition.s 
In Guardianship of a Minor,' a mother appealed from a probate court 
decree finding her unfit and granting the petition for custody of her 
son brought by a private agency under G.L. c. 201, §5.11 While that 
statute deals with the awarding of the custody of a child to a guardian, it 
allows a corporation to be a guardian although actual custody is to be 
awarded to "some suitable person." Challenging the constitutionality of 
the statute, the mother claimed the standard of "unfitness" by which her 
custody could be terminated was vague and thus a denial of due process.6 
The Appeals Court rejected the broad constitutional attack7 on the basis 
that in view of the lower court finding that the mot:her posed a physical 
threat to the child, she was unfit under whatever substantive standard 
might be applied.s Judge Goodman concurred in the result after apply-
ing the more articulated standards of G.L. c. 119, which he found to be 
more appropriate to a case in which an agency, whether private or not, was 
attempting to take a child from its mother.9 
B. LEGISLATION 
§9.10. Adoption: Modernization of procedures. By far the most sig-
nificant legislation in the area of domestic relations for the 1972 Survey 
year was chapter 800, which amended the law of adoption.t One of the 
amendment's primary effects was to _standardize the procedures for con-
sent. In addition to providing a requisite consent form, the new statute 
prohibits the execution of such consent before or within four days after 
birth and establishes the irrevocability of the consent from the date of 
execution.2 It also guarantees the confidentiality of the consent proce-
s 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 77, 291 N.E.2d at 735. 
4 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 467, 298 N.E.2d 890. 
II Id., 298 N.E.2d at 891. 
6 Id. at 469, 298 N.E.2d at 892. 
7 Id. at 470, 298 N.E.2d at 892. 
8 Id. at 473, 298 N.E.2d at 894. 
9 Id., 298 N.E.2d at 894-95. 
§9,10. t G. L to 210. . 
2 G.L. to 210, §2, states in pertinent part: 
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dure.8 Chapter 520 of the Acts of 1973 has limited these new consent 
procedures solely to prospective application. 
Rather than specifying conditions under which the normally required 
consent can be dispensed with, as did former law, the new statute 
vests considerable discretion in the probate court to consider the best 
interests of the child in determining the necessity of consent.' Thus the 
same criteria by which consent has been dispensed with in proceedings 
instituted by the Department of Public Welfare or child care agencies 
under the former section SA-now repealed-are now also applicable 
to determine whether petitions for adoption can be granted without 
consent. The presumption is established, moreover, that the child's best 
interests require dispensing with consent 
if said child has been in the care of the department or a licensed 
child care agency for more than one year .... irrespective of inci-
dental communications or visits from his parents or other persons 
.•. , irrespective of a court decree awarding custody of said child to 
another and notwithstanding the absence of a court decree ordering 
said parents or other person to pay for the support of said child ... _IS 
The purpose of this provision is to remove the obstacle hitherto posed 
by the parent or legal custodian who, after waiving the duties of parent-
hood to the state, sought to claim his privileges to prevent appropriate 
placement of the child. It also brings statutory law into harmony with the 
recent trend of common law as exmplified by Adoption of a Minor.e 
Several additional and beneficial changes have been effected by the 
statute. Eliminated is any notice requirement to state or local welfare 
authorities if the child whose adoption is sought is publicly supported.' 
The requirement of residency in the adoptive parents' home has been 
Such written oonsent shall be executed no sooner than the fourth calendar day after 
the date of birth of the child to be adopted ••• A consent executed in accordance 
with the provisions of this section shall be final and inevocable from date of 
execution. 
a G.L c. 210, 12 states: .. Execution of such consent shall be carried out in a manner 
which shall preserve privacy and confidentiality." 
' G.L c. 210, f!l(c) states: 
In determining whether the best interests of the child will be served by issuing a 
deaee dispensing with the need of consent as permitted under paragraph (b), the 
court shall consider the ability, capacity, fitness and readiness of the child's parents 
or other person named in section two of chapter two hundred ten to assume 
parental responsibility, and shall also consider the plan proposed by the depart-
ment or other agency initiating the petition. 
IS G.L c. 210, as amended, Acts of 1972, c. 800. 
8 !157 Mass. 490, 258 N.E.2d 567 (1970). 
7 G.L c. 210, tll(b), as amended, Acts of 1972, c. 800 states in pertinent part: "The 
court shall issue a decree dispensing with the need fot said • • • notice of any petition 
for adoption of such child subsequently sponsored by said department or agency if it 
finds that the best interests of the child ••• will be served by said decree." 
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reduced from a year to six months and can be waived in the discretion of 
the court.& Finally, to protect the confidentiality of the adoptive process, 
any inspection of adoption records must receive prior authorization from 
the probate court for good cause shown.• 
Another significant legislative amendment to the adoption laws is 
chapter 592 of the Acts of 1972, which provides that the rights of inheri-
tance of a child adopted in a foreign jurisdiction are no different than 
if the child had been adopted within the Commonwealth.1o This rep-
resents a change from the former applicability of the law of the state of 
adoption (except in the case of a conftict of laws). 
§9.11. MiJc:ellaneous. A. for the area of divorce, legislative develop-
ments have been relatively scarce. Chapter 379 of the Acts of 1973 
permits a woman to resume her maiden name or the name of a former 
husband after divorce whether or not she is the party granted it.t 
Chapter 4U of the Acts of 1973 amends the venue requirements· for 
divorce libels by requiring the libel to be heard in the county where the 
parties last lived together, so long as one of the parties still resides there.2 
Former law had permitted the libel to be heard in the county where the 
libellee resided even if the libellant still resided in the county where the 
parties last lived together. The purpose of reducing the libellant's venue 
options, apparently, is to effect a more equitable distribution of libels 
throughout the probate court system. 
Chapter 433 of the Acts of 197!J permits a person providing foster care 
to be notified by the Department of Public Welfare when the child be-
comes eligible for adoption and to be considered as a prospective adoptive 
parenLa 
Perhaps the most important is chapter 740 of the Acts of 197!J which 
abolishes the defense of recrimination in divorce libels, thereby requir-
ing a divorce to be granted in the case where both parties have grounds 
for it.4 Prior law barred the granting of a divorce where both parties 
had sufficient grounds on the theory that one party's grounds constituted 
an affirmative defense to the other party's grounds.ll The often absurd re-
sults reached by strict application of such a doctrine and the usually col-
lusive tactics employed by the parties to avoid its application are now 
rendered unnecessary. 
I G.L c. 210, f!S, as amended, Ada of 1972, c. 800. 
• G.L c. 210, f8, as amended, Acta of 1972, c. 800 .. 
10 G.L c. 210, f9, as amended, Acta of 1972, c. 592. 
19.11. 1 G.L c. 208, 128, as amended, Acta of 1978, c. 879. 
2 G.L c. 208, f6, as amended, Acts of 1978, c. 415. 
a G.L c. 119, 128F, as amended, Acta of 1978, c. 488. 
4 G.L c. 208. f1, as amended, Acta of 1978, c. 740. 
II G.L C. 208, fl. 
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